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LIKES AND RETWEETS CAN’T SAVE YOUR
JOB: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PRIVACY, FREE
SPEECH, AND SOCIAL MEDIA
FRANK E. LANGAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Public employment poses a special conundrum in employee privacy
rights. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution bars Con-
gress from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech.”1 This right
exists irrespective of the intent behind the speech.2 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recognized that “speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest
rung of the heirarchy [sic] of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to
special protection.”3 Nevertheless, when a citizen becomes a government
employee, they take on a “dual status” as both employee and citizen,4 and
the free speech rights that extend to citizens are often curtailed for employ-
ees.5 In fact, until the mid-twentieth century, public employees were denied
a First Amendment cause of action for wrongful termination, based on Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes’s pronouncement that the right to free speech did not
extend to “a constitutional right to be a policeman.”6
It is well-settled today, however, that public employees do not forfeit
all of their free speech rights for a paycheck.7 Indeed, the Supreme Court
held in 1987 that “a purely private statement will rarely, if ever, justify
discharge of a public employee.”8 The Rankin Court appeared to give pub-
lic employees license to speak as they wished in private without being
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. E. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).
3. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Company, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
4. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 599 (2008).
5. Id.
6. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892), but see, e.g.,
O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716–17 (1996) (noting that the
Supreme Court had, “for decades now,” rejected Justice Holmes’s proposition).
7. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
8. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 n.13 (1987).
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fired.9 Yet, over the last thirty years, courts have eroded that right, often
putting the government’s interests in an efficient workspace over the em-
ployee’s free speech rights.10
This phenomenon has been exacerbated by the introduction of an en-
tirely new form of speech on an entirely new medium. Social media, de-
scribed as “online communications in which individuals shift fluidly and
flexibly between the role of audience and author,” has not only broadened
the definition of speech but also made speech much easier to trace back to
the speaker.11 The question of an employer’s ability to limit or manage its
employees’ social media presence has exasperated employees and employ-
ers alike, in both the public and private sectors. To properly evaluate public
employees’ First Amendment rights in the twenty-first century, this paper,
first, provides a broad overview of social media. Next, it reviews the evolu-
tion of free speech jurisprudence generally and focuses on the free speech
issues caused by the rise of social media. The paper then provides suggested
strategies for both government employers and public employees to protect
their respective interests.
II. SOCIAL MEDIA AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
The term “social networking sites” refers to websites “that permit[ ]
persons to become registered users for the purpose of establishing personal
relationships with other users through direct or real-time communication
with other users or the creation of web pages or profiles available to the
public or to other users.”12 Examples of such websites include Facebook,
Twitter, and LinkedIn.13 Essentially, a user creates a profile, uses it to con-
nect to people they know, and then connect to those people’s connections,
9. See also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515 (1980) (“If the First Amendment protects a
public employee from discharge based on what he has said, it must also protect him from dis-
charge based on what he believes.”).
10. See, e.g., Palmer v. Cty. of Anoka, 200 F.Supp.3d 842, 847 (D. Minn. 2016) (“The First
Amendment protects the employee’s speech only if the employee’s interests [in commenting upon
matters of public concern] outweigh the interests of the government employer [in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs].”).
11. Heather A. Morgan & Felicia A. Davis, Social Media and Employment Law: Summary of
Key Cases and Legal Issues, 14–15 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/
labor_law/2013/04/aba_national_symposiumontechnologyinlaboremploymentlaw/
10_socialmedia.authcheckdam.pdf.
12. Monique C.M. Leahy, Facebook, MySpace, Linkedin, Twitter, and Other Social Media in
Trials, 122 AM. JUR. TRIALS 421 (last updated Mar. 2017).
13. Id. See generally FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about/ (last visited
Mar. 9, 2017); TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited Mar. 9, 2017); LINKEDIN,
https://press.linkedin.com/about-linkedin (last visited Mar. 9, 2017). This paper refers primarily to
these three websites for examples because they are the most prevalent. This does not mean, how-
ever, that employment law issues or other legal disputes cannot arise from other social networking
websites.
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creating a “network.”14 Social media, on the other hand “refers to the dis-
semination of information through social interaction that is enabled by web-
based technologies that have facilitated [the] creation and explosive growth
of social media sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, [YouTube], Twitter and
others.”15 Employers are often more concerned with social media than they
are with an employee’s general presence on social networking sites, as an
employee’s untoward remarks can result in damage to the employer’s repu-
tation, or, in some cases, employer liability.16
Social networking has also created new legal issues that could not have
been anticipated in years prior. For example, a Tennessee woman learned
the hard way that “poking” someone else on Facebook can constitute the
violation of a protective order when she was arrested and charged with a
misdemeanor.17 Likewise, social media has derailed many personal injury
claims where a plaintiff’s tweets or Facebook posts have cast doubt on his
or her alleged injuries.18 Even jury selection has gone social, with attorneys
researching prospective jurors and basing questions and strikes on social
media posts.19 The brunt of the legal issues surrounding social media posts
stems from the often-mistaken assumption that the posts were private, or at
least more private than the person who posted them expected.20 In the em-
ployment context, for example, employees may forget that their networks
include coworkers and superiors, or they may simply believe that their pri-
vacy settings are stronger than they are.21
The pervasive nature of social networking sites and social media has
not gone unnoticed by the Supreme Court. On February 27, 2017, the Court
heard oral arguments in Packingham v. North Carolina, a case concerning
whether North Carolina could constitutionally ban sex offenders from ac-
cess to social networking sites.22 Justice Elena Kagan pointed out that “eve-
rybody uses Twitter,” including President Donald Trump, all members of
14. JOHN G. BROWNING, THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING: UNDERSTANDING
SOCIAL MEDIA’S IMPACT ON THE LAW 18–19 (2010).
15. Alan S. Gutterman, Social Media Policies and Procedures, 2012 NO. 6 BUS. COUNS.
UPDATE 2 (Jun. 2012).
16. Morgan & Davis, supra note 11, at 14–15. See also BROWNING, supra note 14, at 84–85
(noting that employee social media posts may put an employer’s intellectual property at risk or
expose the employer to liability for libel or securities law violations).
17. Martha Neil, Did Court Order Ban Facebook ‘Poke’?, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 13, 2009), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/did_court_order_ban_facebook_poke.
18. BROWNING, supra note 14, at 69–76.
19. Id. at 173–80; see also ADAM I. COHEN, SOCIAL MEDIA: LEGAL RISK & CORPORATE
POLICY 19–21 (2013) (discussing ethics opinions from New York City and San Diego regarding
an attorney’s freedoms and duties when reviewing a juror’s social media posts).
20. COHEN, supra note 19, at 12–14; see, e.g., NLRB v. Pier Sixty, LLC, 855 F.3d 115, 125
(2d Cir. 2017) (employee believed Facebook post that resulted in his termination was private).
21. COHEN, supra note 19, at 12.
22. Transcript of Record, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), https://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15-1194_0861.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Packingham Transcript].
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Congress, and every state governor.23 She added that social media sites,
such as Facebook and Twitter, “have become incredibly important parts of
our political culture, of our religious culture.”24 Justice Kagan further noted
that “[social networking] is the way people structure their civic community
life.”25 Likewise, Justice Ginsburg noted that social networking sites now
constitute “a very large part of the marketplace of ideas” and that the First
Amendment includes the right to receive information as well as the right to
free speech.26 Justice Alito also joked that “there are people who think life
is not possible without Twitter and Facebook.”27
The Supreme Court issued its opinion four months later.28 Writing for
the majority, Justice Kennedy described “cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic
forums of the Internet’” as the “most important place[ ] . . . for the ex-
change of views.”29 The Court added that “social media users employ these
websites to engage in a wide array of First Amendment activity.”30 The
Court then held that “to foreclose access to social media altogether is to
prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amend-
ment rights.”31 Ultimately, the Court invalidated North Carolina’s law.32 To
be sure, Packingham does not stand for the prospect that the Supreme Court
would ever require a private business, such as Facebook or Twitter, to allow
access to all citizens.33 But Packingham nevertheless defines social media
as speech within the ambit of the First Amendment, and thus reflects a
Court leery of state-imposed restrictions on social media.
If, as Justice Kennedy suggested in Packingham, social media is the
twenty-first century “public square,” then the logical conclusion appears to
be that social media posts are public speech.34 And yet, social networking
sites have taken the time to develop extensive privacy policies and to offer
their users adjustable privacy settings. For example, Facebook promises its
users: “You have control over who sees what you share on Facebook.”35
Twitter, on the other hand, cautions that “[w]hat you share on Twitter may
23. Id. at 28.
24. Id. at 32.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id. at 47.
27. Packingham Transcript, supra note 22, at 54.
28. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
29. Id. at 1735 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
30. Id. at 1735–36.
31. Id. at 1737.
32. Id. at 1738.
33. See Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.3d 1463, 1466 (10th Cir. 1987) (“the First Amend-
ment does not normally restrict the actions of purely private individuals”); cf. Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (declining to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to “merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful”).
34. Packingham Transcript, supra note 22, at 28.
35. Privacy Basics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/basics (last visited Apr. 15,
2017).
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be viewed all around the world instantly. You are what you Tweet!”36
LinkedIn takes a middling approach, telling its users that they freely agree
to the collection and use of their information by using the social networking
site but that they can also withdraw or modify that consent by changing
their account settings.37 Similarly, Instagram’s privacy policy states that the
photos and videos its users post are available to the public, “as controlled
by any applicable privacy settings that [the user sets].”38 All four policies,
however, seem contrary to Justice Kennedy’s analogy to the “public
square.” A citizen stepping into the public square to speak has no way to
adjust or limit who can hear their speech. But a Facebook user who can
limit the audience of their posts, or a Twitter or Instagram user who can set
their account to “private” so that only their selected, pre-approved followers
can see their social media content, is fundamentally different than the citi-
zen who speaks in the public square.
This friction has caused and continues to cause problems with apply-
ing First Amendment case precedent to cases involving online “speech.”
The next section will review the development and current state of the law
surrounding public employee First Amendment rights and will highlight the
tension between pre-internet First Amendment jurisprudence and the defini-
tion of “speech” in the social media age.
III. EMPLOYEE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA
A. Private Employees
1. At-Will Employment States
Private employees are largely subject to the doctrine of at-will employ-
ment.39 This means that “an employer can terminate an employee at any
time for any reason, except an illegal one, or for no reason without incur-
ring legal liability.”40 At-will employers also “can change the terms of the
employment relationship with no notice and no consequences,” again pro-
vided that their reasons for doing so are not illegal.41
36. Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/privacy?lang=en (last visited Sept.
30, 2016).
37. Your Privacy Matters, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy (last
visited Apr. 24, 2017). Users should note, however, that LinkedIn’s privacy policy changed effec-
tive June 7, 2017; Privacy Policy, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/preview/privacy-poli
cy (last visited May 4, 2017).
38. Privacy Policy, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/155833707900388 (last visited
Jan. 19, 2013).
39. The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx (last vis-
ited Mar. 23, 2017).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only
against abridgment by government, federal or state.”42 Private employers,
therefore, are not constitutionally prohibited from abridging their employ-
ees’ speech, and social media posts by private employees can, and often do,
lead to their termination. A particularly well-known example of a woman
who was fired for complaining on Facebook about her boss, who she was
Facebook friends with, has reached almost mythic status on the internet.43
In fact, some internet users have even dedicated themselves to contacting
the employers and educators of people who post racist messages on their
social media accounts.44 While these employees may have other claims re-
garding their firings, they cannot raise the First Amendment as a defense to
being terminated by a private employer at-will.45
2. Montana
Montana, however, has carved out an exception to the at-will employ-
ment doctrine.  Under Montana’s Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act, non-probationary employees can only be discharged for good cause.46
Good cause means “reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a
failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer’s op-
eration, or other legitimate business reason.”47 Thus, private employees in
Montana have an additional level of protection and theory for wrongful
discharge that no other state offers. However, no Montana court has ad-
dressed the issue of whether a private employee can be fired for social me-
dia posts.48 The question remains open, therefore, as to whether such a
42. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976).
43. Cathal Kelly, Facebook Firing After ‘Friend’ Boss Ripped, THE STAR (Aug. 15, 2009),
https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2009/08/15/facebook_firing_after_friend_boss_ripped.html;
see also Calling Boss ‘Pervy Wanker’ on Facebook—Terminable Offense?, HR DAILY ADVISOR
(Dec. 14, 2010), http://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2010/12/14/calling-boss-pervy-wanker-on-
facebook-terminable-offense/ (citing this example as one instance of employees being fired for
social media posts); but see Facebook Firing, SNOPES, (Aug. 12, 2009), http://message.snopes
.com/showthread.php?t=49414 (message board debating validity/verifiability of the Facebook post
in question and/or whether it was a hoax).
44. Racists Getting Fired, TUMBLR, http://racistsgettingfired.tumblr.com/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2017); see also Racists Getting Fired, GOTTEN, http://racistsgettingfired.tumblr.com/tagged/
GOTTEN (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (collecting examples of people who have actually been fired
or expelled as a result of blog visitors contacting their employers and/or educators about social
media posts listed on the blog).
45. This does not mean that various state laws may not afford similar protections. See, e.g.,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 2017) (barring all employers from making any rule or policy
compelling or restricting their employees’ political affiliations).
46. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (2017).
47. Id. at § 39-2-903(5) (2017).
48. The closest case to the subject of this paper is Rusthoven v. Victor Sch. Dist. No. 7,
wherein a pro se plaintiff alleged he was discriminated against in part on the basis of his Facebook
posts. No. CV-14-170-M-DLC, 2014 WL 6460190, at *4 (D. Mont. Nov. 17, 2014). However,
because the employee in question pled his claim under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
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claim would be tenable, or whether the extra layer of protection, at least in
this context, is illusory.
B. Public Employees
1. Overview
Up until the 1950s and 1960s, “the unchallenged dogma was that a
public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms
of employment—including those which restricted the exercise of constitu-
tional rights.”49 The term “public employees” refers to people who are “em-
ployed in a department responsible for conducting the affairs of a national
or local government.”50 These employees are faced with a special duality as
both citizens and employees. The Supreme Court has articulated this duality
by recognizing that “government has significantly greater leeway in its
dealings with citizen employees than it does when it brings its sovereign
power to bear on citizens at large.”51 In the eyes of the Court, it is “common
sense” that “government offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter.”52 The Engquist Court noted two
main principles in public employee jurisprudence:
First,  although government employees do not lose their constitu-
tional rights when they accept their positions, those rights must be
balanced against the realities of the employment context. Second,
in striking the appropriate balance, [courts] consider whether the
asserted employee right implicates the basic concerns of the rele-
vant constitutional provision, or whether the claimed right can
more readily give way to the requirements of the government as
employer.53
Thus, while public employees maintain some constitutional rights,
courts will also consider the government’s interests as an employer, and
will also require plaintiff-employees to make some showing that their con-
stitutional rights are implicated.54
“At the same time, the [Supreme] Court has recognized that a citizen
who works for the government is nonetheless a citizen.”55 It is well-settled
Act of 2008 (GINA) but did not actually post his genetic information on Facebook, the district
court dismissed his suit for failing to state a claim. Id.
49. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143–44 (1983); see also Joseph O. Oluwole, 32 VT. L.
REV. 317, 321–22 (2007) (describing this time as the “Era of Categorical Denial” of public em-
ployee free speech rights).
50. Civil Servant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
51. Engquist, v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 599 (2008).
52. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.
53. 553 U.S. at 600 (internal citation omitted).
54. But see O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721–22 (1987) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not require public employers to obtain a warrant before searching an employee’s
office).
55. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
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that public employees do not fully abandon their First Amendment rights
when they accept their positions.56 In fact, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the importance of allowing public employees to speak publicly be-
cause they are “‘the members of a community most likely to have informed
and definite opinions about a wide range of matters related, directly or indi-
rectly, to their employment.”57
2. Pickering v. Board of Education
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court provided the
framework for delineating the extent of a public employee’s free speech
rights.58 Marvin Pickering, a teacher, was fired for writing a letter to his
local newspaper criticizing the local Board of Education and school district
superintendent.59 The Pickering Court held that “absent proof of false state-
ments knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher’s exercise of his
right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for
his dismissal from public employment.”60 It also noted that “the public in-
terest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance
. . . is so great” that public officials could not recover damages for defama-
tory statements absent a showing that the person who made those state-
ments knew they were false or made them with reckless disregard for the
truth.61  The Court thus concluded that Pickering’s termination violated the
First Amendment.62
3. Connick v. Myers
Since Pickering, courts have been tasked with striking a balance be-
tween employee free speech rights and governmental interests in avoiding
disruptions by its employees. While the law has continued to defend public
employees from interference with their constitutional rights, courts have
also worked to hone and refine elements of Pickering’s holding. For exam-
ple, in Connick v. Myers, a prosecutor who was aggrieved by a proposed
transfer distributed a questionnaire to her coworkers regarding various of-
fice policies, office morale, and whether they felt a grievance committee
should be created.63 She was terminated both for refusing to accept the
transfer, and for “creating a ‘mini-insurrection’ within the office” with her
56. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also Givhan v. W. Line Consol.
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (extending First Amendment right to private communica-
tions between public employee and supervisor, in addition to public communications).
57. Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 397 (2011) (quoting Pickering, 391
U.S. at 572).
58. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
59. Id. at 564–65.
60. Id. at 574.
61. Id. at 573.
62. Id. at 575.
63. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140–41 (1983).
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questionnaire.64 When the former prosecutor sued alleging that her First
Amendment rights were violated, her employer replied that, while her ques-
tionnaire constituted “speech,” it dealt with only internal office issues, and
thus did not touch on a matter of public concern.65 The Court agreed and
held that, based on the Pickering line of cases, if a plaintiff’s speech “can-
not be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public con-
cern, then it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her
discharge.”66 “When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the commu-
nity, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
offices.”67
This raises the question: what does it mean to “relate” to “any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community?” Connick provides
that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern
must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given state-
ment.”68 Read together with the Court’s characterization of “public con-
cern” as “any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community,” Connick could be construed to create a broad, flexible stan-
dard for public employees to speak their minds.69 The reality, however, is
that Connick created a new defense for government employers. If the gov-
ernment employer can show that the public employee’s speech does not
touch on any matters of political, social, or community concern, then that
public employee cannot claim that their employer violated the First Amend-
ment. A private grievance specific to the employee and his or her employer,
therefore, does not suddenly fall within the ambit of the First Amendment
because the employer is a government agency.70
4. Rankin v. McPherson
The Supreme Court revisited the boundary it established in Connick
just four years later in Rankin v. McPherson. In Rankin, a clerical worker
styled as a “deputy constable” in the Harris County Constable’s Office,
Ardith McPherson, was discussing the 1981 attempt on Ronald Reagan’s
life.71 After criticizing President Reagan’s stance on food stamps and Medi-
64. Id. at 141.
65. Id. at 143.
66. Id. at 146.
67. Id.
68. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48.
69. Ira P. Robbins, What is the Meaning of “Like”?: The First Amendment Implications of
Social-Media Expression, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 127, 140–41 (2013).
70. See, e.g., Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 999 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that the public is
not concerned with “private” matters between employer and employee). It bears noting, however,
that if the employee’s private grievance regarding his or her working conditions concerns a report
of an illegality, the speech may be protected by whistleblower statutes, rather than the First
Amendment. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994).
71. 483 U.S. 378, 380–81 (1987).
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caid benefits, the deputy constable said “if they go for him again, I hope
they get him.”72 A third coworker overheard this statement and reported it
to the Constable, who fired McPherson.73
McPherson sued, alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights.74
The Southern District of Texas held that advocating for the President’s as-
sassination was not a matter of public concern.75 The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, held that “the life and death of the President are obviously matters of
public concern.”76 The Supreme Court held that “[t]he inappropriate or con-
troversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it
deals with a matter of public concern,” and concluded that McPherson’s
speech “plainly dealt with a matter of public concern.”77 In doing so, the
Court emphasized that an attempt on the President’s life is “a matter of
heightened public attention,” and that McPherson’s original statement was
“made in the course of a conversation addressing the policies of the Presi-
dent’s administration.”78
The Rankin Court then moved to balancing McPherson’s interest in
making her statement against her employer’s interests in promoting the effi-
ciency of its services, as required by Pickering.79 The Court noted that the
pertinent considerations for such a balancing test were “whether the state-
ment impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a
detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loy-
alty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the
speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.”80
The Rankin Court resolved this balance in favor of McPherson, noting that
there was no evidence she had disrupted or “interfered with the efficient
functioning of the office.”81 The Court further highlighted that there was no
“danger that McPherson had discredited the office by making her statement
in public.”82 “Where, as here, an employee serves no confidential, poli-
cymaking, or public contact role, the danger to the agency’s successful
functioning from that employee’s private speech is minimal.”83 Because
McPherson’s duties were purely clerical, her speech did not impact the
functioning of the office, and she did not interact with the general public,
72. Id. at 381.
73. Id. at 381–82.
74. Id. at 383–84.
75. Id. at 385 n.8.
76. Id. at 385 (quoting McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir. 1986)).
77. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386–87.
78. Id. at 386. The Court also noted that the fact that McPherson had repeated her statement
at her supervisor’s request did not create a separate instance of speech which she could be termi-
nated for. Id. at 386 n.10.
79. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 389.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 390–91.
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the County Constable’s Office’s interest in terminating her was outweighed
by McPherson’s interests in her First Amendment rights.84
Rankin had two major impacts on public employee free speech rights.
First, it established that the First Amendment protections of even controver-
sial or distasteful speech extended into the arena of public employment,
which helped establish a broad definition of “public concern” under Con-
nick.85 Second, Rankin carved out advantages in the Pickering balance for
public employees who have minimal interaction with the public, and who
make their statements in private.86 These principles, taken at face value,
seem to suggest that a statement made on an individual’s private social
networking profile that relates to a matter of public concern would be im-
munized. The case law that has developed in the thirty years since Rankin,
however, has taken a decidedly pro-employer turn.
5. Garcetti v. Ceballos
Almost twenty years later, the Supreme Court added a caveat to
Rankin’s protection of private speech that touches on a matter of public
concern. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, Deputy Los Angeles County District At-
torney Ceballos became aware of a potentially inaccurate affidavit that had
been used to obtain a search warrant.87 Ceballos reported these possible
inaccuracies to his supervisors, and submitted multiple memoranda on the
subject.88 Ceballos claimed that, because he voiced his concerns, he was
denied a promotion, was transferred to another courthouse, and had his du-
ties reassigned.89 Ceballos contended that these actions constituted retalia-
tion in violation of the First Amendment.90
The Supreme Court noted that Ceballos spoke only to his superiors,
rather than publicly but held that it would not serve Pickering’s goals to
deny him the protections of the First Amendment solely because his speech
occurred in the office.91 Likewise, the Court held that the fact that Cebal-
los’s memorandum concerned the subject matter of his employment did not
automatically mean that he was not entitled to these same protections.92
Rather, the Court found that the controlling factor was that his speech was
made “pursuant to his duties,” and held that “when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking
84. Id. at 392.
85. The Court did note, however, that had McPherson threatened to kill the President herself,
the First Amendment would have been inapposite to her case. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386–87.
86. See id. at 388 n.13 (noting that purely private speech will rarely justify discharging a
public employee).
87. 547 U.S. 410, 413–14 (2006).
88. Id. at 414.
89. Id. at 415.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 420–21.
92. Id. at 421.
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as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline.”93
The duality recognized by Pickering and affirmed two years later in
Engquist thus took on a new importance: under Garcetti, speech could be
private, and could touch on matters of public concern but still not be pro-
tected because the employee was not speaking as a citizen. This immedi-
ately raised a pressing question: how broadly could the scope of an
employee’s “official duties” be construed?94 Even Justice Souter, in his dis-
sent, expressed concern that Garcetti could limit the First Amendment pro-
tections enjoyed by professors at public colleges and universities, whose
speech and writings may be almost entirely attributable to their official du-
ties.95 The Court also admitted that it had “no occasion to articulate a com-
prehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties in
cases where there is room for serious debate.”96 The Garcetti Court made it
clear, however, that speech which merely “concerned” the employment du-
ties was not the same as speech in the scope of those duties.97 Additionally,
in 2014, the Supreme Court made clear that it was overbroad to apply
Garcetti to testimony pursuant to a subpoena, because the purpose of testi-
fying in response to a subpoena is to fulfill an obligation as a citizen to
speak the truth.98 Fortunately, for purposes of this paper, the scope of an
employee’s official duties is largely a secondary consideration, because
posting on social media is rarely an “official duty” of the public employees
in this type of case.
6. Attempts to Apply This Precedent to Social Media “Speech”
The four major cases described above appear to create a framework
where (1) public employees retain some of the First Amendment rights they
are guaranteed as citizens99 (2) provided that their speech touches on mat-
ters of public concern,100 and (3) these protections are more likely to prevail
if the employee speaks privately,101 (4) unless they are speaking pursuant to
93. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
94. Krystal LoPilato, Recent Case, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Lose First
Amendment Protection for Speech Within Their Job Duties, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 537,
543 (2006).
95. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy, writing for the major-
ity, reserved this question in Garcetti. Id. at 425. Lower court opinions have sought to be more
explicit. See, e.g., Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 412 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Garcetti does
not apply to teaching and academic writing performed by public school teachers and public uni-
versity professors).
96. Id. at 424.
97. Id. at 421.
98. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014).
99. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
100. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
101. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 389–91 (1987).
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their official duties as an employee.102 Courts have had difficulty applying
these general guidelines to social media speech, however, particularly with
respect to whether an employee can ever speak “privately” when “speak-
ing” on the internet.
Few appellate courts have had the opportunity to apply Garcetti in the
context of social media. As discussed further in Section IV, the Fourth Cir-
cuit is on the cutting edge of First Amendment retaliation claims related to
social media, having already ruled on whether “liking” a Facebook post
constitutes “speech,” and whether a public employer’s social media policy
can be a prior restraint on free speech. None of these cases, however, have
spent much time assessing the parameters of Garcetti’s language regarding
whether the speech was made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.103
However, the Fifth Circuit has held that identifying oneself as a public
employee, even on Facebook, does not erase the employee’s First Amend-
ment rights.104 “To the contrary, such identification by public employees is
welcome as they ‘occupy trusted positions in society.’”105 Thus, the Firth
Circuit reasoned, Garcetti did not preclude a First Amendment retaliation
claim by a former police officer who identified herself as such and used
pronouns like “we” and “our” in her Facebook posts.106 By contrast, the
Sixth Circuit recently held that a fire chief who signed an email with his
title constituted evidence that the email was sent pursuant to his official
duties, over and above the fact that the information contained in the body of
the email was information that he had a duty to distribute to his subordi-
nates.107 Thus, a circuit split currently exists regarding whether identifying
oneself by one’s title in an electronic “speech” can be evidence that the
speech was made as an employee rather than as a citizen.
Even circuits that have not addressed Rankin or Garcetti in the context
of social media still have established tests that offer some insight into how
such claims would be litigated. For example, the First Circuit has created a
two-part inquiry for Garcetti defenses: “(1) what are the employee’s official
responsibilities? and (2) was the speech at issue made pursuant to those
responsibilities?”108 For the first prong of this test, the First Circuit does not
consider the job description but rather “the duties an employee is actually
expected to perform.”109 This test could, in future cases, create a presump-
tion that public employee social media posts are citizen speech, and not
102. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
103. See generally Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 2016); Bland v.
Roberts, 730 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2013); Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.
2017).
104. Graziosi v. City of Greenville, 775 F.3d 731, 737 (5th Cir. 2015).
105. Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419).
106. Id.
107. Holbrook v. Dumas, 658 F. App’x 280, 288–89 (6th Cir. 2016).
108. Mercado-Berrios v. Cancel-Alegria, 611 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2010).
109. Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25).
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employee speech, unless posting on social media is one of the duties that
employee is expected to perform. Garcetti is unlikely, therefore, to bar any
civil servants in the First Circuit from claiming their tweets or YouTube
videos are subject to the First Amendment.
There are some obvious exceptions to the doctrines described above.
For example, the public university professor who “jokes” on Facebook
about hiring a hit man to kill a student, by contrast, is understandably not
afforded First Amendment protections, even if their speech was private and
outside the scope of their ordinary duties.110 Such speech evokes concerns
about college campus shootings.111 The example becomes more nuanced,
however, if the verb is changed from “kill” to, for example, “slap,” or if the
professor simply writes “I hate my students” as a Facebook status. Does the
professor have a right to express disappointing but not necessarily illegal
sentiments such as “I hate my students?” What if the professor simply
“likes” or “retweets” a post about (hypothetically) slapping a student? Can
the university attempt to govern what the professors it employs do and do
not say on social media? Does it make a difference if the professor’s
Facebook page says that they work for that university or not? What if the
example is not a professor and a public university but rather a firefighter
and a county? The next section attempts to offer a (by no means exhaustive)
set of strategies that anticipate the answers to these questions. This paper
devotes additional time to employee strategies because the employees bear
the burden of proving that they were terminated in violation of their First
Amendment rights.
IV. MOVING FORWARD: SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
A. Employer Strategies
1. Government Employers Should Recognize That Their Social
Media Policy May be a Prior Restraint on Free Speech.
The main issue facing government employers currently is whether a
social media policy constitutes a “prior restraint” on free speech. Prior re-
straints on speech are heavily disfavored at law.112 Likewise, “[c]ontent-
based regulations are presumptively invalid.”113 A government employer
that creates a policy dictating what subjects its employees cannot speak on
110. BROWNING, supra note 14, at 81.
111. Id.
112. See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (“Any prior restraint on
expression comes to this Court with a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”)
(internal quotation omitted).
113. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
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runs the risk, therefore, of facially violating the First Amendment.114 This
issue was tangentially addressed in the employment context by the Supreme
Court in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU”),
where the Court held that, to regulate speech in anticipation of future
harms, the government needed to demonstrate “real . . . not conjectural”
harm that would be in fact alleviated “in a direct and material way” by the
regulation.115
Currently, there is a paucity of case law addressing how this precedent
would apply to social media policies. However, in December of 2016, the
Fourth Circuit struck down a city police department social networking pol-
icy which precluded “any information that would tend to discredit or reflect
unfavorably upon the [Department] or any other City of Petersburg Depart-
ment or its employees.”116 The Fourth Circuit held that “the speculative ills
targeted by the social networking policy are not sufficient to justify such
sweeping restrictions on officers’ freedom to debate matters of public con-
cern.”117 This reflects the NTEU standard that the government cannot
merely point to speculative future harms to justify limiting a public em-
ployee’s First Amendment rights and suggests that future courts would also
find an attempt to preemptively limit social media expression overly broad
unless the government employer can show actual harm that will be directly
prevented.
Also, the Supreme Court noted in NTEU that it “normally accord[s] a
stronger presumption of validity to a congressional judgment than to an
individual executive’s disciplinary action.”118 If § 501(b) of the Ethics in
Government Act, which was passed by Congress, cannot pass muster, then
an executive agency’s internally drafted social media policy may face an
even greater uphill battle. Accordingly, government employers should be
careful to craft social media policies that do not restrict what their employ-
ees can post but rather warn them of what types of posts can be cause for
discipline (e.g., posts that discredit the office or disrupt its efficient
functioning).
114. Cf. COHEN, supra note 19, at 26 (noting that regulators and legislators have a clear inter-
est in protecting social media speech, and cautioning employers to “be careful not to overreach in
seeking to curb such activity through policy.”).
115. 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995).
116. Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 408–09 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
omitted) (alteration in original).
117. Id.
118. 513 U.S. at 468.
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2. Government Employers Currently Have No Reason to Fear
State “Off-Premises Legal Activity” Statutes but Should Be
Mindful of How These Statutes May Evolve.
As a separate consideration, social media policies that regulate what
public employees can post while off-duty may run afoul of different state
laws. For example, California, Colorado, New York, and North Dakota stat-
utes all prohibit an employer from “discriminating” against an employee
“based on any lawful activity” that the employee engages in “off the prem-
ises and during non-working hours.”119 Such statutes, however, typically
include exceptions allowing employers to regulate off-duty activity that is
“related to a bona fide occupational qualification” or “the employee’s abil-
ity to perform his job,” or if such regulation “is necessary to avoid a conflict
of interest with the employer.”120 Even though posting on social networks is
a lawful activity, a government employer can make the same argument that
the employee’s posts negatively impact his or her ability to perform the job
and can thus defeat both the First Amendment and state law claims. There-
fore, government employers in these states do not yet have to worry about
crafting a separate defense for any state law claims under these statutes.
B. Employee Strategies
1. Public Employees Should Assume That “Speech” is Broadly
Defined
It is axiomatic that a blog post, a tweet, a Facebook status, or a You-
Tube video is an act of speech.121 Taking the time to record a video, or to
type a blog, status, or tweet is functionally no different than writing a letter
to your local newspaper. But what about the aspects of social media that
require no typing or recording, and are as simple as pushing a button?
A commonly cited example is “retweeting,” which is “a way to repub-
lish a post that another Twitter user has written.”122 This is accomplished
by “hover[ing your mouse] over the ‘tweet,’ click[ing] ‘retweet,’ and con-
119. Christine Burke & Barbara Roth, Labor: Lifestyle Discrimination Laws are Becoming
Increasingly Prevalent, INSIDE COUNS. (Jun. 13, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/06/
13/labor-lifestyle-discrimination-laws-are-becoming-I; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (West
2017); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5 (West 2017); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney
2017); N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 14-02.4-03 (West 2017).
120. Burke & Roth, supra note 119.
121. Examples of cases concluding Facebook posts are a form of speech include: Keefe v.
Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 530 (8th Cir. 2016); Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 342–44
(4th Cir. 2017); Grazioski v. City of Greenville, 775 F.3d 731, 737 (5th Cir. 2015). Cf. NLRB. v.
Pier Sixty, LLC, 855 F.3d 115, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2017) (addressing whether Facebook post quali-
fies as union-related speech).
122. Sandra Graschopf, Retweet Definition: What Retweet Means and How to Use Them, THE
BALANCE (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.thebalance.com/retweet-definition-what-retweet-means-
and-how-to-use-them-896699.
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firm[ing] the action by clicking on the ‘retweet’ button again.”123 This func-
tionality has sparked a debate: does retweeting another user’s tweet mean
that you have endorsed the message of that tweet?124 Some argue that, be-
cause “‘retweeting’ someone else’s ‘tweet’ creates words on the user’s
Twitter profile, as if the user typed the words,” a retweet constitutes an act
of speech, or at least expressive conduct, because “the user intends to con-
vey the message that she agrees with the ‘tweet’ and viewers will under-
stand it that way.”125 Others argue that “Twitter users understand that
sometimes a retweet is just a retweet — that it ‘involves sharing or pointing
something out, not necessarily advocating or endorsing.’”126 To be on the
safe side, public employees should assume that their retweets constitute an
act of speech, because clicking the button to do so is a voluntary act.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit recently held that “liking” a post on
Facebook can constitute an act of speech.127 While some theorize that this
is likely to become a minority opinion,128 it is currently the only opinion
available on the subject. “Liking” a Facebook post, at the time that Bland
and Grutzmacher were filed, required only the click of a single button, and,
in the age of smartphones, was fairly easy to do accidentally. In 2016, how-
ever, Facebook unveiled additional “reactions” that users can apply to a
post, including “love,” “sad,” “angry,” and “haha.”129 While no case has yet
addressed whether these “reactions” are speech, the fact that choosing a
reaction other than “like” requires the user to click and hold the “like” but-
123. Bethany C. Stein, Comment, A Bland Interpretation: Why a Facebook “Like” Should be
Protected First Amendment Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1255, 1276 (2014).
124. See Sam Kirkland, Retweets are Endorsements at NPR and AP, but not at NYT, POYNTER
(Jul. 10, 2014), http://www.poynter.org/2014/retweets-are-endorsements-at-npr-and-ap-but-not-at-
nyt/258240/ (comparing and contrasting policies of National Public Radio, the Associated Press,
and the New York Times on whether retweets constitute endorsements); see also Kate Knibbs,
The FBI Says Retweets are Endorsements, GIZMODO (Sept. 17, 2015, 7:45 PM), http://gizmodo
.com/the-fbi-says-retweets-are-endorsements-1731526051 (noting FBI usage of retweets as evi-
dence in criminal complaints); Charles Pulliam-Moore, You May Not Think Retweets are Endorse-
ments, but the Justice Department Might, FUSION (Apr. 5, 2016, 11:45 AM), http://fusion.net/you-
may-not-think-retweets-are-endorsements-but-the-ju-1793855990 (noting same for U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice).
125. Stein, supra note 123, at 1277.
126. Jack Shafer, Twitter Panic in the Newsroom, REUTERS (Jul. 10, 2014), http://
blogs.reuters.com/jackshafer/2014/07/10/twitter-panic-in-the-newsroom/; see also Jay Rosen
(@jayrosen_nyu), TWITTER (Jul. 11, 2014, 7:38 AM), https://twitter.com/jayrosen_nyu/status/
487591850857885697 (opining that argument for retweets constituting endorsement belies a lack
of trust in users).
127. Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 342–44 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Bland v.
Roberts, 730 F.3d 386, 386 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); see also Stein, supra note 125, at 1276–77
(advocating for recognition of Facebook “like” as substantive speech, or at least expressive
conduct).
128. See MORGAN & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 20 (expressing doubt that other courts would
adopt this viewpoint).
129. Liz Stinson, Facebook Reactions, The Totally Redesigned Like Button, Is Here, WIRED
(Feb. 24, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/facebook-reactions-totally-rede
signed-like-button/.
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ton and then select another reaction makes these other reactions even more
similar to “retweets.” And if the default “like” is an act of speech, there is
an even stronger case that a “reaction,” which requires additional user effort
to post, is also speech. These “reactions” are comparable to “retweets” in
terms of the steps required, and therefore public employees, or at least pub-
lic employees in West Virginia, Virginia, and the Carolinas, should antici-
pate that “retweets” would also be considered an act of speech. This is
dangerous territory, however, because now the person who “retweets” is
dependent on the poster of the original tweet to have touched on a matter of
public concern. Even then, if it is someone else’s opinion, “retweeting” it
may not be protected speech, because a court could find that all “retweet-
ing” accomplishes is “simply adding one’s views to the views of countless
others.”130
This assumption poses a two-edged sword: on the one hand, almost
anything the public employee does on social media constitutes “speech”
and, if it touches on a matter of public concern, can be protected by the First
Amendment. On the other hand, almost anything the public employee does
on social media is speech that could get them fired for discrediting their
employer or disrupting the workplace. Thus, while public employees do not
entirely forfeit their First Amendment rights, they do, to some extent, take
on additional risks if they have an active social media presence.
2. Public Employees Can Take Steps to Tip the Pickering Balance
in Their Favor.
Multiple federal circuits have noted that “Pickering’s constitutional
rule turns upon a fact-intensive balancing test.”131 Different circuits have
broken Pickering’s holding into different factors. For example, the Fourth
Circuit evaluates
whether a public employee’s speech (1) impaired the maintenance
of discipline by supervisors; (2) impaired harmony among co-
workers; (3) damaged close personal relationships; (4) impeded
the performance of the public employee’s duties; (5) interfered
with the operation of the institution; (6) undermined the mission
of the institution; (7) was communicated to the public or to co-
workers in private; (8) conflicted with the responsibilities of the
employee within the institution; and (9) abused the authority and
public accountability that the employee’s role entailed.132
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit considers
130. See Palmer v. Cty. of Anoka, 200 F.Supp.3d 842, 848 (D. Minn. 2016) (holding that
employee did not have strong First Amendment interest where she did not contribute new insights
or facts to the debate).
131. Bartlett v. Fisher, 972 F.2d 911, 916 (8th Cir. 1992).
132. Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 317 (4th Cir. 2006).
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(1) the need for harmony in the office or work place; (2) whether
the government’s responsibilities require a close working rela-
tionship to exist between the plaintiff and co-workers when the
speech in question has caused or would cause the relationship to
deteriorate; (3) the time, manner, and place of the speech; (4) the
context in which the dispute arose; (5) the degree of public inter-
est in the speech; and (6) whether the speech impeded the em-
ployee’s ability to perform his or her duties.133
This test “is flexible and the weight to be given to any factor varies depend-
ing on the circumstances of the case.”134 The Second, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits’ tests, by contrast, consider only the first, second, and sixth factors
of the Eighth Circuit’s test.135 Thus, for example, a public school teacher in
Minnesota might prevail or lose based in part on whether the public has any
interest in his or her speech being protected, whereas a police officer in
Kentucky or a firefighter in Connecticut does not have to make any show-
ing of such interest.136 In general, however, the employee’s successful argu-
ment focuses on a lack of disruption in the workplace, the lack of public
exposure to their speech, and the absence of any impact on their ability to
perform the duties of their job, which courts often tie to evidence of friction
(or lack of friction) in the workplace as a result of the speech.137
One argument some plaintiffs have advanced is that courts should ap-
ply an actual disruption standard.138 This would mean that a government
employer had to show that the employee’s speech had actually resulted in a
disruption or complaints in the workplace before it could justify terminating
them. This change would allow for a more objective and certain test of
whether a public employee’s speech, in fact, impairs their ability to do their
job or whether that speech actually causes friction in the workplace.139 Such
a standard, unfortunately, has been rejected by at least eight circuit courts,
most recently the Sixth Circuit in January 2017.140 It bears noting that the
133. Hemminghaus v. Missouri, 756 F.3d 1100, 1114 (8th Cir. 2014).
134. Germann v. City of Kan. City, 776 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1985).
135. See, e.g. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of New York, 336 F.3d 185,
197 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)) (government can
meet its burden by showing that employee’s speech impairs discipline by superiors or workplace
harmony, detrimentally impacts working relationships, and/or impedes performance of the em-
ployee’s job); Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 684 (6th Cir. 2017); Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d
491, 496 (10th Cir. 1990).
136. See also Palmer v. Cty. of Anoka, 200 F. Supp. 3d 842, 848 (D. Minn. 2016) (balancing
Pickering test against employee in part because “the degree of public interest in her speech was
minimal” and “[s]he was simply adding her views to the views of countless others”).
137. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
138. Emily McNee, Note, Disrupting the Pickering Balance: First Amendment Protections for
Teachers in the Digital Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1818, 1847–48 (May 2013).
139. See id. at 1851–52.
140. Gillis, 845 F.3d at 685 (citing Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 1995); Wal-
lace v. Benware, 67 F.3d 655, 661 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1108
(11th Cir. 1997); Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 979 (9th
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Tenth Circuit, however, has held that “[t]he government must produce evi-
dence of an actual disruption of services which results from the employee’s
speech.”141 Thus, there is some hope for employees that the Supreme Court
might take up this issue, although the likelihood that the Court would over-
rule eight circuit courts of appeals in favor of a ninth is slim.
Moreover, an “actual disruption” standard is easy to measure for teach-
ers when it is couched in the context of student complaints.142 The “actual
disruption” standard becomes much more difficult, however, in the context
of public employees like firefighters, 911 operators, or IRS agents, who
serve important public functions but have far fewer interactions with the
general public, and thus fewer opportunities for public complaints.143 Ac-
cordingly, even if the Supreme Court could be persuaded to adopt an “ac-
tual disruption” standard, there is still a risk that the standard would be
tailored to some subset of public employees, and would not offer protection
to all civil servants.
An alternate proposal advanced by Professor Toni M. Massaro would
be to eliminate the distinction between speech on matters of public and
private concern.144 This would necessarily eliminate the distinction between
the public employee’s speech as a citizen and his or her speech as an em-
ployee.145 The problem with such a proposal, however, is that it would not
only require an abandonment of the Supreme Court precedent in the public
employee free speech context, but also would blur the Court’s distinction
between “high value” and “low value” speech in First Amendment case law
as a whole.146 Moreover, as the Court has noted, the government cannot
operate efficiently “if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter.”147 And Massaro’s proposal would require the employee’s prima
facie case to consist solely of “the assertion that the employee was disci-
plined for speech activity.”148 This, effectively, would eliminate the use of
motions to dismiss under Rule 12 in any public employee free speech claim,
subjecting the government employer in every First Amendment wrongful
termination case to the burden of discovery and clogging the courts with
summary judgment rulings. This runs completely counter to the Supreme
Court’s goal of governmental efficiency. Massaro’s justification for this
Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Cohen, 165 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 1999); Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist.,
805 F.3d 454, 472 (3d Cir. 2015)).
141. Schalk, 906 F.2d at 496.
142. McNee, supra note 138, at 1851.
143. These types of public employees, however, have an advantage in the Pickering balancing
test under Rankin, because they are less likely to discredit their employers.
144. Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 67 (Nov. 1987).
145. Id. at 68.
146. For a discussion of “high value” and “low value” speech, see Marcy S. Edwards, Jill
Leka, James Baird & Stefanie Lee Black, An Overview of the First Amendment’s Protection of
Speech Generally, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE, A.B.A. (1998) Westlaw.
147. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
148. Massaro, supra note 144, at 68.
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proposal—that the negative consequences of being fired from a government
position for the employee outweigh the negative impact on a court’s
docket—is unlikely to convince the Supreme Court or most other govern-
mental officials.149
3. Public Employees Can Work to “Privatize” Their Online
Speech.
While this paper is not focused on the technical aspects of social
networking, no list of suggestions and strategies for public employees
would be complete without reminding them to tune up their privacy set-
tings. As social media users have been burned by their inflated perception
of their own privacy, different authors have provided suggestions for how
all users can better manage their privacy settings. Limiting more personal
posts to a set audience of connections can help avoid creating a workplace
disruption and exposing oneself to termination.150 Facebook allows its users
to create “lists” of friends and then adjust the privacy settings of individual
posts so that only people on set lists can see those posts.151
Another strategy would be for public employees to limit the disclosure
of their employment information to LinkedIn. The holding in Rankin makes
it clear that the employee is more likely to prevail in the Pickering balance
if they cannot discredit their employer.152 LinkedIn offers an entire free
social network related to careers, networking, and job advancement, so em-
ployees can still be part of an online community based on that part of their
identity without adding that information to their profiles attached to other
social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. This is not en-
tirely necessary, as the Northern District of Ohio recently determined when
it found that a police officer whose profile displayed a police emblem still
spoke as a citizen because he “communicated through Facebook while he
was off-duty and using his home computer.”153 If the officer had not dis-
played the police emblem on his profile, however, the judge might have
been even more convinced that the speech was private.
Likewise, public employees may find themselves afoul of Rankin’s
dicta protecting an employee who does not discredit their employer if they
decide that using their title or employer will lend credence to their argu-
149. Id.
150. Julie D. Andrews, 6 Easy Steps to Increase Your Privacy on Facebook, ADWEEK (Apr.
26, 2011) http://www.adweek.com/digital/6-easy-steps-to-increase-your-privacy-on-facebook/.
151. Id.
152. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 389 (1987); but see Palmer v. Cty. of Anoka, 200 F.
Supp. 3d 842, 846, 848–49 (D. Minn. 2016) (Plaintiff reduced confidence in her employer and her
Facebook posts impaired her ability to do her job even though her Facebook did not identify her
employer).
153. Hamm v. Williams, Case No. 1:15CV273, 2016 WL 5462959, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29,
2016).
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ment.154 There is a clear difference between Ardith McPherson telling her
boyfriend in the back room of the Harris County Constable’s Office that she
hopes whoever shot at Reagan gets him next time,155 and twenty-first cen-
tury “McArdith Pherson” going to the Harris County Sheriff’s Office’s
Facebook page156 and writing “I work here and I just wanted to say that I
hope someone shoots Donald Trump because he wants to build a wall along
the southern border of the United States.” To be sure, this is not a threat,
and was not expressly proscribed by Rankin.157 The proposed border wall is
also certainly a matter of public concern—it touches on a matter of political
and social interest. However, by posting “I work here” on a public
Facebook page, “McArdith Pherson” has discredited her employer in a way
that Ardith McPherson did not in 1987. Thus, public employees need to be
extremely careful if they plan to use their job titles and experience to lend
credence to their social media posts.
Of course, there is always the option to abstain from social networking
sites altogether. This is almost certainly a guarantee for public employees
that they will not be fired for online speech. However, as the Supreme
Court noted in Packingham, fewer and fewer Americans are choosing this
option.158 Likewise, declining to engage with coworkers on social network-
ing websites reduces the chance that one’s social media posts will create a
workplace disruption or be reported to a superior. However, many US
workers enter the workforce in part to forge social connections.159 It is no
solution, therefore, to tell public employees that they gave up their freedom
to participate in social networking sites or to befriend their coworkers when
they signed their contracts, any more than it was a solution for Justice
Holmes to suggest in McAuliffe that public employees sacrificed their First
Amendment rights by taking their jobs.160
These opportunities for public employees to privatize their online
speech are not perfect solutions. For example, even if a user sets his or her
Twitter account to private, a user who follows them could still take a
screenshot of a tweet, post the screenshot, and then the original user’s tweet
lives on, even if they delete it.161 Again, many social networking users have
an overinflated idea of how private their profiles and posts truly are.
154. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 389; but see Graziosi v. City of Greenville, 775 F.3d 731, 737 (5th
Cir. 2015) (holding that identification by public employees is welcome).
155. Id. at 381.
156. Harris County Sheriff’s Office, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/HCSOTexas/
?ref=BR_rs (last visited May 2, 2017).
157. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386–87.
158. See generally Packingham Transcript, supra note 22, at 28, 32, 54 (noting pervasiveness
of social media use among Americans).
159. Susan J. Stabile, Workers in the Vineyard: Catholic Social Thought and the Workplace, 5
VILL. J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 372, 377 n.29 (2008).
160. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 (Mass. 1892).
161. Cf. Racists Getting Fired, TUMBLR (Oct. 26, 2015, 3:33 AM), http://racistsgettingfired
.tumblr.com/post/131938828592/dicksandwhiches-racist-getting-fired-is-such-a. In this case, the
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C. Review of Previous Hypothetical Questions and a Legislative
Proposal
Returning to the hypothetical about the public university professor
who writes about slapping his or her students on Facebook, a court would
likely conclude that the professor could be fired under Connick, because
such speech does not address a matter of public concern.162 The same ap-
plies to the professor who writes “I hate my students,” because the general
public has no great interest in how the professor feels about his or her stu-
dents, nor is that a matter of political or social concern. However, “liking”
or “retweeting” a post has only been judicially labeled “speech,” in the
Fourth Circuit. Accordingly, if the hypothetical public university professor
“liked” or “retweeted” a post about slapping a student in any other jurisdic-
tion, and was fired for that post, that professor would need to make an
additional showing of “speech” before they can even claim First Amend-
ment retaliation.163 Whether the professor’s social networking profile says
where they work could hurt their case if the court applies Rankin and finds
that the post discredited their employer, or it could be a non-factor under
the Fifth Circuit’s case precedent.164 The university can certainly adopt a
social media policy and a code of conduct for online behavior, but it needs
to be wary of imposing a prior restraint on its professors’ speech. For exam-
ple, a social media policy that merely says “professors at Pub University
shall not post comments that could reflect negatively on the institution or its
educational experience on social networking sites” is likely too general.165
Pub University could strengthen its case, however, if it could identify spe-
cific examples of online speech that would result in termination and high-
light how those examples would disrupt the workplace.
As Section IV of this paper has highlighted, outside of the general
framework created by the Supreme Court, the rules regarding employee free
speech rights are inconsistent across different jurisdictions. Supreme Court
action, however, is likely to be incremental, slow, and narrow. Rather than
waiting for the Supreme Court to resolve circuit splits on how many factors
the Pickering balancing test weighs, or whether an “actual disruption” stan-
dard is appropriate, Congress could weigh in and establish, once and for all,
some form of online privacy act. Such an act could protect the free speech
rights of all employees, public or private, on social media websites that are
“adequately protected,” so long as their posts are not made using an em-
subject’s Twitter account no longer exists. Sorry, that Page Doesn’t Exist, TWITTER, https://twitter
.com/eri82915 (last visited Apr. 29, 2017). However, the screenshot captured and uploaded to
another blog, along with a screenshot of the subject’s Facebook account, remains publicly availa-
ble online.
162. 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
163. Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 342–44 (4th Cir. 2017).
164. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 389 (1987); Graziosi v. City of Greenville, 775 F.3d
731, 737 (5th Cir. 2015).
165. Accord Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 408–09 (4th Cir. 2016).
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ployer’s device or while acting within the scope of their employment. The
statute, or any accompanying regulations by the Federal Communications
Commission or the Department of Labor, could then define the baseline
privacy settings for various social media sites that employees must imple-
ment for their own profiles to be “adequately protected” for purposes of the
statute.
This proposed act and regulations would recognize the various degrees
of privacy and control that people can exercise in their use of social media,
nuances that often elude judicial opinions, and also allow the statute to ef-
fectively create a rebuttable presumption that the speech was not disruptive
if the speaker adequately privatized their profile. Employers would still
have the opportunity to point to actual disruptions that occurred to over-
come this presumption, but would not need to if the online profile was not
“adequately protected.”
This proposed legislation is not a perfect solution. For example, dis-
covery in such litigation could prove extremely frustrating because the
claim would turn, in part, upon what privacy settings the employee had in
place at different times, and because the user could change those settings so
quickly. However, in the spirit of above-mentioned state statutes that pro-
hibit termination for engaging in lawful activity or using lawful products
outside of work, a detailed act of Congress to safeguard employee speech
rights would go a long way in guiding the judiciary to uniform treatment of
public employees’ free speech rights. Moreover, it would reflect Justice
Kennedy’s understanding that social networking sites are the new “public
square,” and would incentivize public employees to contribute their knowl-
edge, rather than chilling their speech for failure that it will fall into one of
the pitfalls established by Connick or Garcetti.
V. CONCLUSION
The ongoing evolution of social media guarantees that the definition of
speech will continue to evolve. As these changes shift the framework cre-
ated by Pickering and its progeny, public employees’ First Amendment
rights are likely to wax and wane in different spheres. Public employees can
take heart in the strides they have made in just the last fifty to sixty years,
but at the same time need to recognize the new challenges presented by
social media. Likewise, public employers must recognize that their attempts
to adjust for the social media age may actually run afoul of the First
Amendment. Barring legislative action, it appears extremely unlikely that
freedom of expression will ever constitute an absolute defense against ter-
mination for public employees. However, by using some of the strategies
and proposals outlined above, employees may be able to carve out greater
protections for their private social media posts, and avoid the career damage
that stems from termination. After all, if social networking sites are the
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twenty-first century public square, then the rest of society has an interest in
hearing the informed speech of its civil servants on social networking sites
as well.
